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Kraus: Religious Exemptions - Applicability to Vegetarian Beliefs

NOTE
RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS-APPLICABILITY TO
VEGETARIAN BELIEFS
I.

INTRODUCTION

Conflict arising as a result of the tension between church and state
has plagued American society since its inception. "'Man's dedication
has often been torn between God and country, religious faith and
patriotism. Church and state have been the most significant institutions
within which Western man has lived, but struggle has ensued between
them because each has tended to make absolute claims.""
Recently, parents who are complete vegetarians have attempted to
exempt their children from receiving vaccinations because the
vaccinations are cultured using animal and human fetal cells.2
Vegetarians eschew the consumption and use of animals and their
byproducts.3 Three sets of parents petitioned the Bridgehampton School
District for religious exemptions from Public Health Law section 2164's
mandatory inoculation requirement on the ground that the vaccinations
run contrary to their spirituality.4 The Bridgehampton School District
refused to grant the waivers because the school district did not consider
vegetarian practices to fall within the ambit of the religious exemption
provided by the New York State legislature in section 2164(9). 5 But the
fight for exemption is not over-the parents are threatening to challenge
the school district's refusal and take the matter to the courts in a case of
first impression.6 This Note analyzes the likelihood that vegetarian

1. McCartney v. Austin, 293 N.Y.S.2d 188, 197 (Sup. Ct. 1968) (quoting Petitioners'
Memorandum), affd, 298 N.Y.S.2d 26 (App. Div. 1969).
2. See Julia C. Mead, Issue of Immunization Waivers Raises FundamentalQuestions, N.Y.
LJ.(Long Island), Aug. 7, 2000, at LI-I.
3. See ACAD. AM. ENCYCLOPEDIA 535 (1981).
4. See Mead, supranote 2.
5. See id.
6. See id.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2001

1

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 1 [2001], Art. 6
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:197

beliefs will satisfy the requirements necessary to secure a religious
exemption.
To clarify the issues addressed in this Note, Part II provides a
framework for understanding the intense controversy behind providing
religious exemptions from mandatory vaccination laws, particularly the
tension between public health advocates and religious freedom
advocates. Additionally, Part II discusses New York's mandatory
vaccination law, Public Health Law section 2164. Part nI discusses the
state of Public Health Law section 2164 today as developed by case law.
The courts have developed a three-pronged test for determining
qualification for religious exemption: (1) is the belief asserted
"religious" in nature; (2) is the religious belief sincerely held; (3) is there
a public health/welfare interest that outweighs the granting of the
exemption. Part IV explores the probable arguments vegetarians will
assert in an attempt to gain an exemption and the arguments that will be
made against such an entitlement. Part V predicts how the court would
decide if presented with the case of a vegetarian arguing for entitlement
to the religious exemption provided under section 2164(9).
II. MANDATORY VACCINATION LAWS
Mandatory vaccinations for school-age children have been the
subject of controversy for as long as they have been required. Mandatory
state immunization laws illustrate the "tension between society's
commitment to both religious freedom and public health."' While every
state requires children be immunized for certain diseases prior to
entering school, forty-eight states grant religious exemptions to this
requirement.9 Exemptions heighten the tension that exists between
advocates of religious freedom and those of public health.
Public health advocates fear that exemptions will result in the
spread of communicable diseases to the population that is exempt from
immunization and also to nonexempt populations. '° Public health
advocates believe that state vaccination laws greatly reduce the instances
7. See Sherr v. Northport-E. Northport Union Free Sch. Dist., 672 F. Supp. 81, 89 (E.D.N.Y.
1987); In re Christine M., 595 N.Y.S.2d 606, 614 (Fam. Ct. 1992).
8. Timothy J. Aspinwall, Religious Exemptions to Childhood Immunization Statutes:
Reachingfor a More Optimal Balance Between Religious Freedom and Public Health, 29 Loy. U.
CHI. L.J. 109, 109 (1997).

9. See id. at 109.
10. See id. at 112 (illustrating that, as the number of persons vaccinated in the population
decreases, the number of persons infected will increase). For example, persons susceptible to
infection are those over school-age who were never vaccinated and nonvaccinated persons who
have not yet reached school-age. See id. at 113-14.
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of certain diseases and ultimately eliminate a disease from a population
by reducing the number of persons who can serve as hosts for the
disease." Allowing religious and/or medical necessity exemptions from
vaccination, however, makes this goal of greater population immunity
much more difficult to reach. In order to achieve population immunity,2
the vaccination rate within a population must be sufficiently high,
generally between eighty and ninety-five percent, contingent upon the
disease being vaccinated." Therefore, proponents of public health argue
that childhood vaccination requirements are necessary to protect
unvaccinated children and the general public from continuing risks of
contagious disease, even if the requirements conflict with religious
interests. 4
Advocates of religious freedom argue that their constitutional right
to be free from government interference with religious practices trumps
the rationale espoused by those in favor of mandatory childhood
vaccinations. Religious freedom advocates premise their beliefs on the
constitutional amendment, "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof[."' '
Religious advocates argue that if mandatory vaccinations are contrary to
the teachings of a religious belief, forcing them to submit to vaccination
violates the constitutional right to free exercise of religion. Although the
positions taken by religious advocates are as varied as religion itself, all
religious advocates agree that public health interests should not trump
their religious beliefs. 6 Arguments put forth by religious advocates
include: (1) the State must exhaust all other means to reach its public
health goals, including voluntary means, before it has the authority to
require its inhabitants to act in contravention of their religious beliefs to
satisfy public health requirements; (2) the failure of the State to provide
religious exemptions infringes upon parental rights to encourage their
children in the practice of a religious belief; and (3) the State should not

11. See id. at 113.
12. See id.
13. See id. at 113 n.17 (explaining that the immunization rates necessary to effect population
immunity are as follows: for measles and pertussis, 92-95%; rubella, 85-87%; mumps, 90-92%;
diptheria and polio, 80-85%).
14. See id.
at 114.
15. U.S. CONsT. amend. I; see also Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940)
(limiting state action by incorporating the First Amendment freedoms into the Fourteenth
Amendment).
16. See Aspinwall, supranote 8, at 114.
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force parents to make the difficult choice between
abiding by their
17
religious convictions or facing criminal liability.

Traditionally, mandatory vaccination laws enacted by state
legislatures were held to be valid constitutional exercises of state
power.'s Jacobson v. Massachusetts9 is the most significant case that
addressed the constitutionality of mandatory vaccination laws. In
Jacobson, the United States Supreme Court upheld the conviction of a
Massachusetts man who, in violation of a state law that required
vaccination for all citizens of Cambridge, refused to receive an
immunization for smallpox.20 The appellant, Jacobson, argued that the
Massachusetts law violated constitutionally protected rights of due
process and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment because
it provided an exemption for physician certified "unfit" children and had
no similar provision for adults.2' Adults who refused to receive
vaccination were subject to a fine or imprisonment for refusal to submit
to vaccination 2' Jacobson offered evidence to illustrate that the receipt
of a vaccination would be detrimental to his health.2 He alleged that he
had suffered serious injury as a result of a prior vaccination and that his
son's exhibition of the same reaction to vaccinations indicated that a
hereditary condition existed which made both individuals susceptible to
injury from introduction into their bodies of vaccine matter.2 4 Jacobson
argued that the law denied him equal protection of the laws because an
exemption was available to parents to protect their children from the
receipt of vaccinations that would be detrimental to their health, but did
not provide the same protection to adults themselves for their own
protection.2 The Court disagreed with this argument and stated that the
law did not deny Jacobson equal protection because the law was
applicable to all similarly situated individuals.' Jacobson and his son
were not similarly situated individuals because Jacobson was an adult
and his son was a child. The Court reasoned that there were many
17. See id. at 115-17.
18. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 38 (1905) (holding mandatory
vaccination statute constitutional as within the Commonwealth's police powers).
19. 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
20. See id. at 12-13. The legislation at issue resulted from a determination by the Board of
Health of Cambridge finding it necessary for the public health and safety that citizens be vaccinated
against smallpox. See id. at 12.
21. See id. at30.
22. See id. at 26.
23. See id. at 23-24.
24. See id. at 36-37.
25. Seeid. at l7.
26. See id. at 29-30.
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reasons that a legislature would enact regulations that, while appropriate
to enforce against adults, would not be appropriate to enforce against
children. 7
Jacobson also argued that the state legislature's delegation of power
to the Board of Health of Cambridge to determine when it was necessary
to require mandatory vaccination of the general public and what
exemptions were to be permitted denied him due process.2 Jacobson
argued that compulsory vaccinations violated an individual's liberty
interest in that such vaccinations forced the introduction of a disease into
the body.29 The Court, again, disagreed. The Court recognized that "the
liberty secured by the Constitution of the United States ...does not
import an absolute right in each person to be, at all times and in all
circumstances, wholly freed from restraint. There are manifold restraints
to which every person is necessarily subject for the common good."3 °
The Court reasoned that the right to liberty did not mean that individuals
had license to act in any manner they saw fit.3
The Court held that the police power of a state included enacting
reasonable regulations, relating to matters completely within its territory,
that promote the health and safety of its inhabitants, and that do not
affect citizens of other states. 2 It further refused to interfere with the
manner in which a state chooses to exercise its police power, provided
that the Constitution of the United States was not contravened and no
right granted or secured by it was infringed upon. 3 The Court
determined that the police power of the State included the authority to
enact mandatory vaccination laws and it was the province of the state
legislature to decide whether vaccination was the best procedure
T 4
available to protect the public health.
The Supreme Court in Zucht v. King,3 relying on Jacobson,
reaffirmed a state's authority to enact compulsory vaccination laws
pursuant to its police power.36 The petitioner in Zucht also questioned the
constitutionality of mandatory vaccination laws. Zucht challenged
municipally enacted ordinances conditioning attendance at public
27. See id. at 30.
28. See id. at 30-3 1.
29. See id. at 26.

30. Id.
31.
32.
33.
34.

See
See
See
See

id. at 27.
id. at 25.
id.
id at30-31.

35. 260 U.S. 174 (1922).
36. See id. at 176.
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schools or other places of education on presentment of a certificate of
vaccination, on the ground that they violated the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, the same reasons
voiced in Jacobson.37 However, the Court was not persuaded and
followed its holding in Jacobson that mandatory vaccination laws did
not violate the Federal Constitution." In both cases the Court found that
a state's authority to enact compulsory vaccination laws results from a
state's police power and that it is constitutionally permissible for a state
to delegate to municipalities the power to determine when and in what
circumstances it is necessary, for the protection of the public health, that
health laws take effect." In Zucht, the Court stated that it was well
settled that there is no violation of the Equal Protection Clause where a
regulation is not all embracing. 40 States have the authority, pursuant to
their police power, to enact regulations that reasonably classify. 4' The
Court additionally reasoned that the ordinances passed by the City of
San Antonio did not confer arbitrary and unreasonable power on the
public officials charged with the duty to enforce the ordinances, but only
conferred on the officials the broad discretion required for the protection
of public health.42 This analysis mirrored the analysis used in Jacobson.
Both Courts recognized the appropriateness of granting local officials
the responsibility of protecting local inhabitants from public health
dangers. 3
The principle that a state has the authority to require its citizens to
be immunized in the interest of the public health and welfare was
established through Jacobson and Zucht. As a result of these rulings, and
spurred by the increased threat of contagious diseases to their citizens,
states throughout the United States enacted compulsory vaccination laws
for the protection of the public welfare.

III. NEW YORK'S COMPULSORY VACCINATION LAW
A. Legislative FindingsPrompting the Statute's Enactment
In 1966, pursuant to its police power to enact legislation reasonably
designed to protect the public health, New York passed Public Health
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

See id. at 175-76.
See id. at 176.
See id.; Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905).
See Zucht, 260 U.S. at 177.
See id. at 176-77.
See id. at 177.
See id. at 176-77; Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 27-29.
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Law section 2164, requiring school-age children to present a certificate
of vaccination as a predicate to entering either public or private school in
New York.' At the time of the statute's enactment, the New York
legislature found that medical advances rendered it possible to reduce
the incidence of polio through immunizations.4a In fact, these
immunizations, proven safe by medical evidence, were at least ninety
percent effective in preventing paralysis caused by polio.46 The
legislature found that a great many Americans were still not immunized
in 1966, either due to ignorance or apathy.47 Furthermore, the legislature
found that a large percentage of these nonimmunized individuals were
preschool-age children under the age of five, and that, correspondingly,
almost one-half of those inflicted with crippling polio were also of this
age group. 43 Lastly, the legislature found that the majority of those
nonimmunized persons were members of the lower socioeconomic strata
41
who were living in highly concentrated urban areas.
To protect those individuals most susceptible to communicable
diseases, such as polio, the New York State legislature required
immunization as a prerequisite to attendance at a public, private or
parochial school in New York State. 0 The legislature declared that the
mandatory vaccination requirement was in the best interest of those who
would have chosen to forgo immunization.5 ' It was unlikely that a family
with a limited income would be able to afford the medical care necessary
for a child afflicted with polio or that the child with polio would be able
to support him/herself upon reaching the age of maturity. 2 Both of these
instances would require financial contributions from taxpayers and
charitable organizations to support and care for the afflicted individual. 3
Therefore, mandatory vaccination requirements imposed by the
legislature were necessary to protect not only those individuals who
were not immunized, but also the health and economic well being of
society s4
44. See N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2164(7)(a) (McKinney Supp. 2001).
45. See 1966 N.Y. Laws 994 § 1(1) (codified as amended at N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw § 2164
(McKinney Supp. 2001)) (stating the legislative intent, findings, and purposes for enacting the
statute). People who contract polio may become disabled. See kL
46. See id.
47. See id. § 1(2).
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. See id. § 1(5).
51. Seeid § l(4).
52. See id. § 1(3).
53. See id.
54. See id. § 1(4).
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B. Enactment of Public Health Law Section 2164
Public Health Law section 2164 was passed in 1966 and effective
as of January 1, 1967."5 The statute required that all preschool children
be vaccinated against poliomyelitis." Throughout the past thirty-five
years, the statute has been amended to protect against additional
contagious diseases that have been determined to pose a threat to the
public health 7 The statute now requires that every child be vaccinated
against polio, mumps, measles, diphtheria, rubella, varicella,
Haemophilus influenza type b, and hepatitis B prior to attending public,
private, or parochial school. 8 Schools are not permitted to allow children
to be admitted to school or attend school in excess of fourteen days
without provision of a certificate of immunization to the proper
authority.59 The statute provides that, in the event a parent or guardian is
unable to afford immunization from a private health practitioner, the
health officer of the county where the child resides will vaccinate the
child free of charge6
C. Exemption Granted Under the Act
The statute also provides for a religiously-based exemption to the
requirement of mandatory vaccinations. Public Health Law section 2164
provides that the law will "not apply to children whose parent, parents,
or guardian hold genuine and sincere
religious beliefs which are contrary
' 61
to the practices herein required.
At the time of the passage of Public Health Law section 2164, the
language of the religious exemption required that the parent(s) or
guardian(s) seeking exemption for their children be "bona fide members
of a recognized religious organization" whose teachings were contrary to
vaccination. 62 The United States District Court decision in Sherr v.

55. See 1966 N.Y. Laws 994 (codified as amended at N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2164
(McKinney Supp. 2001)).
56. See id. § 1(5).
57. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2164 (McKinney Supp. 2001).
58. See id. § 2164(6).
59. See id. § 2164(7)(a).
60. See id. § 2164(4).
61. Id. § 2164(9). There also exists an exemption from state mandated immunization when a
physician licensed to practice medicine in the state certifies that immunization may be detrimental
to the health of the child. See id. § 2164(8). That exemption is not relevant to this Note.
62. Compareid.§ 2164(9), with McCartney v. Austin, 293 N.Y.S.2d 188, 191 (Sup. Ct. 1968)
(comparing the language of the exemption after amendment to the language in the statute as it read
prior to amendment), affd, 298 N.Y.S.2d 26 (App. Div. 1969).
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Northport-East Northport Union Free School District3 held that
language unconstitutional because the requirement that parents be part of
a "recognized religious organization" violated both the Establishment
and the Free Exercise of Religion Clauses of the Constitution."
At a minimum, the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment
ensures that "[n]either a state nor the Federal Government can set up a
church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or
prefer one religion over another." The case of Lemon v. Kurtzman set
forth a three-pronged test that the Court has consistently used to
determine the constitutionality of laws challenged under the
Establishment Clause.67 For a statute to be deemed constitutional under
the test, it must satisfy the following three requirements: (1) the
legislature must have had a secular purpose for adopting the enactment
in question; (2) the primary effect of the law to be scrutinized must be
one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) the statute must
not result in an excessive entanglement of government with religion."
The court in Sherr applied the Lemon test and held that Public
Health Law section 2164 failed on at least two of the three elements. 6
The court determined that the primary effect of the language in section
2164(9), limiting the eligible class, inhibited the religious practices of
those individuals who were opposed to vaccinations on religious
grounds but did not belong to groups that the state recognized as bona
fide religious organizations." Members of bona fide religious
organizations were permitted to live according to the tenets of their
religious beliefs while those not belonging to recognized religious
groups were forced to either act contrary to their religious beliefs or
deny their children an education. 7' The court also found the former
version of Public Health Law section 2164(9) resulted in the excessive
entanglement of the government in religious affairs because it gave
official recognition to certain religions and not others, thereby involving
the government
in religious matters to a degree not permitted by the
72
Constitution.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

672 F. Supp. 81 (E.D.N.Y. 1987).
See id. at 98.
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
403 U.S. 602 (1971).
See Sherr, 672 F. Supp. at 89 (discussing the Lemon test).
See id.
See id.
See id.
Seeid. at89-90.
See id. at 89.
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The constitutionality of the limiting language of the original
religious exemption to Public Health Law section 2164 was also
challenged under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.7 3 In
determining the constitutionality of a statute under the Free Exercise
Clause, the Supreme Court followed a four-step inquiry developed in the
case of Sherbert v. Verner.74 The court in Sherr applied the four-step
Sherbert test and made determinations regarding the following inquiries:
(1) whether a religious belief or practice is involved; (2) whether such
belief or practice is burdened by the government action in question;
(3) whether a compelling state interest justifies such an infringement on
First Amendment rights; and (4) if such a compelling interest exists, is
there a less restrictive alternative that would enable the State to satisfy
its purpose in the action in question without infringing on the First
Amendment rights of individuals.75 The court determined: (1) an
application for exemption by a person who is not a member of a
recognized religious organization involved a religious belief or practice;
(2) compulsory vaccination under section 2164 burdens such person's
adherence to a religious belief or practice; (3) no compelling state
interest existed that justified restricting the religious free exercise only of
individuals who do not belong to recognized religious groups as opposed
to members of bona fide religious organizations; and (4) less restrictive
alternative means existed to allow the state to provide a religiouslybased exemption from compulsory vaccination. 6 The court held that if
New York wanted to continue to provide a religious exemption, the
exemption must be offered to all persons who hold genuine and sincere
religious beliefs that oppose vaccination. 7 In response to this decision,
the New York State legislature amended Public Health Law section
2164(9) to delete the requirement of membership in a recognized
religious organization to receive the benefit of the exemption.7"

73. See id.
74. 374 U.S. 398, 403-09 (1963). The test for determining the constitutionality of a generally
applicable law under the Free Exercise Clause has recently been altered by the Supreme Court. See
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884-90 (1990).
75. See Sherr, 672 F. Supp. at 90.
76. See id. at 90-91.
77. See id. at 98.
78. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2164(9) (McKinney Supp. 2001).
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IV. PRESENT STANDARD OF THE LAW NECESSARY TO QUALIFY FOR
THE RELIGIOUS EXEMPTION UNDER NEW YORK LAW

Parents and guardians have challenged the denial of vaccination
waivers by school boards in the New York State courts and the federal
district courts on the ground that their children qualify to receive the
benefit of the religious exemption provided by section 2164(9). These
courts have developed a three-pronged test to be satisfied for a child to
qualify to receive the benefit of the religious exemption under the law.
The test requires that a party arguing for exemption must: (1) hold a
"religious" belief contrary to vaccination, as opposed to an opposition to
vaccination on purely moral or medical considerations; (2) sincerely
hold such religious belief; and (3) demonstrate that there are not any
circumstances present within the general community which would
represent a clear and present danger to the public of the spread of the
particular communicable disease."
Public Health Law section 2164(9)'s religiously-based exemption
demonstrates the state legislatures "intent to statutorily preserve,
whenever possible, a coexistence of public health protection and a
recognition of the right of serious religious practice."' The exemption
seeks to allow those individuals who sincerely oppose vaccinations
because of religious precepts to exercise their religious beliefs free from
criminal liability while at the same time disregard the public health goal
of maximum population immunity to protect the general public from the
spread of communicable disease. However, this balance has proven
difficult to strike.8
A.

The FirstProng:Defining Religious Beliefs for the Purposesof the
Exemption Under the Statute

When individuals seek religious exemption from vaccination, the
primary inquiry is whether the grounds asserted as the bases for
opposition are religious in nature. 2 The exemption is limited by its terms
solely to those who oppose immunization on the basis of religious

79. See Mason v. Gen. Brown Cent. Sch. Dist., 851 F.2d 47, 50 (2d Cir. 1988); Berg v. Glen
Cove City Sch. Dist., 853 F. Supp. 651, 655 (E.D.N.Y. 1994); Sherr, 672 F. Supp. at 92, 94; Brown
v. City Sch. Dist., 429 N.Y.S.2d 355, 357 (Sup. Ct. 1980), aft'd, 444 N.Y.S.2d 878 (App. Div.
1981); Maier v. Besser, 341 N.Y.S.2d 411,412 (Sup. CL 1972).
80. Brown, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 357.
81. See Sherr,672 F. Supp. at 83.

82. See id. at 92.
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beliefs, beliefs not resulting from moral or medical considerations,
scientific and secular theories, or philosophical and personal beliefs.83
The task of determining whether the beliefs that oppose vaccination
are religious in nature as opposed to having secular, moral, personal, or
philosophical foundations is not easy. Scholars and jurists alike have
wrestled for years with the problems that are inherent in defining
religion for legal purposes. 84 Any attempt to define religion for legal
purposes runs the risk of undue governmental involvement in
ecclesiastical matters, which is not permitted by the First Amendment.85
The Supreme Court case of United States v. Seeger 6 provides
guidance for defining religious beliefs that deserve the protection of the
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. s7 The Court in Seeger
ruled that a religious belief, defined as a belief in a Supreme Being,
included those that have either a theocentric or anthropocentric basis.8s
Seeger involved the statutory interpretation of the term "religious
training and belief' as used in the Universal Military Training and
Service Act ("Act"). 9 The Act exempts from combatant training and
service in the United States armed forces those individuals who are
conscientiously opposed to war and participation in war in any capacity
on the ground of their religious training and belief.90 The Act defined
"religious training and belief' as "'an individual's belief in a relation to
a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from any
human relation, but [not including] essentially political, sociological, or
philosophical views or a merely personal moral code.' 9' The petitioners,
individuals who claimed that their conscientious opposition to service in
the armed forces came within the statutory definition of religious
training and belief, challenged the statute under both the Free Exercise
and Establishment Clauses because the statute did not provide similar
exemption for nonreligious conscientious objectors to war.'
83. See Berg, 853 F. Supp. at 655; Sherr, 672 F. Supp. at 92-93.
84. See Sherr, 672 F. Supp. at 92. The courts have attempted to develop a workable definition
for religion. Relevant to the context of religious exemptions are two decisions that deal with the
issue of whether a statutory exemption for conscientious objector status impermissibly favors one
religion over another, or religion over nonreligion. See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970);
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
85. See Sherr,672 F. Supp. at 92.
86. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
87. See id. at 165-66.
88. See id.
89. See id. at 164-65 (interpreting 50 U.S.C. app. § 4560) (1958)).
90. See id.
91. Id. at 165 (alteration in original) (quoting 50 U.S.C. app. § 4560) (1958)).
92. See id.
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Additionally, the petitioners claimed that the statute violated the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment because it discriminated
between different manifestations of religious beliefs. 93
The Court interpreted the statute to exclude from conscientious
objector status those who oppose war on an economic, political, or
sociological basis because such determinations have, throughout history,
been deemed within the province of the government. 94 An individual's
economic, political, or sociological convictions have never trumped the
determination of the state that war was necessary and men were needed
to fight it.95 After the Court made the determination as to what beliefs
did not come within the ambit of the statute, it was necessary for the
court to determine what beliefs were within the parameters of the
statutory definition. 96
The Court developed a test to be used for determining religious
beliefs that deserved the protection of the Constitution. 97 The test
provided that a protected religious belief was "[a] sincere and
meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a place
parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying for the
exemption." ' Additionally, the Court stated that the test should be
applied objectively. 9 New York courts have used the language in Seeger
to define religious beliefs for the purpose of granting religious
exemptions from mandatory inoculations because the analysis of the
Court is applicable to cases where the Free Exercise and Establishment
Clauses are at issue.' ° Seeger illustrated that for a religiously-based
exemption statute to withstand constitutional scrutiny, the definition of
religion must be sufficiently broad to include not only traditional theistic
religious beliefs, but also nontheistic religions and moral and ethical
beliefs held by individuals.'0 '
The requirement of a sufficiently broad definition of religion does
little, however, to clarify what is correctly considered a religion for legal
purposes.' 2 A broad definition often exacerbates the problem of
93. See id.
94. See id. at 173.

95. See id.
96. See id. at 174.
97. See id. at 176.
98. Id.

99. See id. at 184.
100. See Brown v. City Sch. Dist., 429 N.Y.S.2d 355, 356 (Sup. Ct. 1980), aff'd, 444 N.Y.S.2d

878 (App. Div. 1981).
101. See Aspinwall, supranote 8, at 129.
102. See Jesse H. Choper, Defining "Religion" in the FirstAmendment, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV.

579,579.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2001

13

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 1 [2001], Art. 6
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:197

classification as either religious or nonreligious.' 3 Moreover, the
principle of defining religion broadly poses a problem when mandatory
vaccinations are at issue. The broader the definition of religion adopted,
the greater the number of individuals who qualify for exemption under
the statute. '0 4 This reduces the number of vaccinated individuals in a
population, in turn reducing the public health goal of population
immunity. The state's interest in enacting mandatory vaccination laws,
and in protecting the public from the spread of contagious disease,
would therefore be undermined by a broadly interpreted exemption."
The state's interest would be better promoted by a narrowly interpreted
exemption that would render the smallest number of individuals exempt
from vaccination, thereby decreasing the number
of individuals that have
01 7
the capacity to serve as hosts for contagions.
Numerous other cases have provided further guidance for
determining when beliefs are to be considered "religious" beliefs. The
Supreme Court abandoned the requirement that a religion need be
founded upon a belief in a "God." ' The Supreme Court and the Second
Circuit each declared that religion involves the "ultimate concerns" of
individuals, which are not the intellectual concerns of a person but rather
the most important interest in that person's life, such that they would
rather suffer adverse consequences than violate their "concerns. ' 09
The definition given to "religious beliefs" in New York Public
Health Law section 2164(9) has been a point of contention. Individuals
subject to the law initiated several actions, claiming their beliefs were
wrongly classified as nonreligious, thereby not allowing them to qualify
for an exemption pursuant to New York Public Health Law section
2164(9)."0

103. See Aspinwall, supra note 8, at 129.
104. See id.
105. See id.
106. See Sherr v. Northport-E. Northport Union Free Sch. Dist., 672 F. Supp. 81, 88 (E.D.N.Y.
1987).
107. See Aspinwall, supra note 8, at 129-30.
108. See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961).
109. See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 187 (1965); Int'l Soc'y for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc. v. Barber, 650 F.2d 430,439-41 (2d Cir. 1981).
110. See generally Galinsky v. Bd. of Educ., No. 99-9027, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 9529, at *2
(2d Cir. May 9, 2000) (stating that parents' belief was motivated by their personal fears for their
daughter's well being); Mason v. Gen. Brown Cent. Sch. Dist., 851 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1988) (finding
that parent's belief was a nonreligious embodiment of chiropractic ethics); Lewis v. Sobol, 710
F. Supp. 506 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (finding that parents' religious beliefs of spiritual perfection qualified
for exemption); Sherr v. Northport-E. Northport Union Free Sch. Dist., 672 F. Supp. 81 (E.D.N.Y.
1987) (holding that parents' pantheistic beliefs were religious); In re Christine M., 595 N.Y.S.2d
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New York State courts and the federal district courts have
attempted to discern whether beliefs held by various petitioners were in
fact religious using criteria developed in previous Supreme Court and
court of appeals decisions discussed above."' In Sherr (a consolidated
case), for example, the court was faced with the task of determining
whether the beliefs asserted by both the Sherrs and the Levys were
religious in nature in order to be accorded exemption under the law." 2 In
making this determination, the court applied the principles set forth
above by the Supreme Court and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals."'
The Sherrs espoused in their complaint that their opposition to
inoculation stemmed from a belief in the universe as a "natural order"
where "'[h]ealth is the unhindered expression of life (God) moving
through the body, mind and heart."' ' 4 Inoculation is contrary to the
natural order of the universe because it "'hinders life (God) and thus is
contrary to God.""' 5 The Levys espoused a belief in which the
"'Universe and all things in it are the manifestation of Divine
Consciousness or God.""' 6 The Levys believed that everything in the
Universe is connected and that disease results from the disharmony
caused when a human being has separated himself from the rest of
creation.! 7 Further, "'[v]accinations, and other forms of medical
intervention do not take into account the spiritual nature of disease, and
therefore they are a violation of God's natural and spiritual laws."' 8 The
court categorized the beliefs held by the petitioners' as "pantheistic" and
religious for the purposes of exemption." 9

606 (Fain. Ct. 1992) (holding that father's sincerely held beliefs were rooted in scientific rather than
religious concerns).
11 1. See supra text accompanying notes 79-107.
112. See Sherr, 672 F. Supp. at 92.
113. See id. The court relied on Torcaso, Seeger, Barber,cited supra notes 108-09, and Allen
v. United States, 760 F.2d 447 (2d Cir. 1985), in assessing which beliefs deserved protection under
the First Amendment. See id.
114. Sherr,672 F. Supp. at 92 (quoting the Sherrs' beliefs as set forth in their complaint).
115. Id. at 92-93 (quoting the Sherrs' beliefs as set forth in their complaint).
116. Id. at 93 (quoting the Levys' beliefs as set forth in their complaint).
117. See id.
118. Id. (quoting the Levys' beliefs as set forth in their complaint). The Levys explained their
opposition to inoculation by stating that "'any introduction into that process of a foreign element
outside the normal processes of the body, is going to [a]ffect the body adversely and, therefore, we
feel it is a violation in a sense of our nature, physical, spiritual religious nature."' Id. (alteration in
original) (quoting the Levys' beliefs as set forth in their complaint).
119. See id. "Pantheism" is defined as "'a doctrine that the universe conceived of as a whole is
God: the doctrine that there is no God but the combined forces and laws that are manifested in the
existing universe."' Id. at 93 n.6 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICIONARY
(1986 ed.)).
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Mason v. General Brown Central School District"2 illustrates
beliefs that the court held insufficient to entitle its followers to
exemption.12 The Masons contended that their opposition to
immunization stemmed from a belief in the necessity of living a "natural
existence.', 22 Their belief in "natural existence," although couched in
chiropractic principles, resulted in their creation of a belief system that
they argued could be classified as religious.' 2 The court recognized that
religious beliefs include more than "traditional Judeo-Christian, Moslem
or Buddhist forms of worship."' For a belief to qualify as religious it is
not necessary that the belief have at its core an orthodox or traditional
God.'2' Instead, beliefs need only "'occup[y] a place in the life
26 of its
possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God."
Still, the Masons' belief system was deemed secular because an
individual's contention that his belief is of religious magnitude is not
dispositive in finding the belief to be religious in nature.'2 7 An additional
inquiry is necessary to determine what beliefs are in fact based on
religious tenets, and what beliefs are based instead on secular or
scientific principles. 2 1 The court found that the Masons' commitment to
living a "natural existence" was a "choice of lifestyle [that] does not rise
to the level of religion."' 29 The court reasoned that all individuals make
basic life choices concerning where to live, what to eat, and how to raise
children, and although such decisions are important and often supported
by strong conviction, the decisions are not religious.3 Instead, such
decisions made by individuals are personal and philosophical in nature,
rendering them ineligible for protection under the religion clauses and
not exempted under section 2164.'
Lewis v. Sobol 32 suggests that courts may look at references to a
transcendent reality when deciding whether beliefs are to be deemed
religious, 33 even though the Supreme Court in Seeger held that
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

851 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1988).
See id. at 52.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 51.
See id.
Id. (quoting United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 166 (1965)).
See id.
See id.
Id. at 50, 52.
See id.
See id.
710 F. Supp. 506 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
See id.
at 513-14.
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nontheistic beliefs are eligible for exemption without reference to a
transcendent reality.M The United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York considered whether the petitioners' ("Lewis" and
"Fishkin") belief in a natural order and awareness of the spirituality of
the land qualified as a religious belief for the purpose of the exemption
under section 2164.131 The court expanded on the notion of "ultimate
concern" articulated in Mason and Seeger, stating that an individual's
ultimate concern is his/her religion. 136 "'A concern is "ultimate" when it
is more than "intellectual.' ' 137 The court went on to declare that a
concern is "more than intellectual when a believer would categorically
'disregard elementary self-interest ... in preference to transgressing its
tenets. '"131 The court determined that the beliefs of the petitioners were
the result of concerns that were "more than intellectual in nature.' ' 39 The
court found that the belief system held by Lewis and Fishkin was not
predicated on scientific or biological concerns; rather, their distinctive
lifestyle was a function of their belief in a creator."4 The petitioners'
views of their creator and of individual spiritual perfection that ran
contrary to vaccination were held religious in nature, therefore
qualifying for religious exemption. 4'
The distinctions drawn between the beliefs held by the petitioners
in Lewis (deemed religious) and those held by the Masons in Mason
(deemed philosophical) are not clear. The Masons articulated a belief
system based on a natural existence where health emanates from
within. 42 Lewis and Fishkin shared this belief with the Masons. 143 If the
Masons' beliefs were similar to those of Lewis and Fishkin, why were
the Masons' beliefs deemed not religious, therefore not deserving of
exemption? The court in Lewis distinguished the beliefs of Lewis and
Fishkin from those of the Masons by emphasizing that there was no

134. See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 184-86 (1965).
135. See Lewis, 710 F. Supp. at 509-10. The beliefs of Lewis and Fishkin were similar to those
espoused by vegetarians as evidenced in their statement that "'[wie therefore have come to believe,
in a manner respectful of others, that we cannot consume live or dead organisms, or their
byproducts, for any purpose."' Id. at 514 (quoting Petitioners' Statement).
136. See iL at513.
137. Id. (quoting Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Barber, 650 F.2d 430, 440
(2d Cir. 1981)).

138. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703, 708 (2d Cir.
1943)).
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id. at 514.
See id.
See id.
See Mason v. Gen. Brown. Cent. Sch. Dist., 851 F.2d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1988).
See Lewis, 710 F. Supp. at 514.
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evidence that the beliefs at issue in the case were based predominantly
on biological or scientific considerations. '44 The court in Mason held the
beliefs espoused to be nonreligious because Dr. Mason himself stated at
trial that his objection to vaccination was primarily biological and that
his fears were the result of medical considerations.14 ' Dr. Mason, the
father of the child seeking exemption from inoculation, was a
chiropractor and in his training was taught to reject drug and surgical
intervention. 46 Mason attempted to argue the point that, although his
beliefs were based on chiropractic principles, they were so ingrained in
his family's daily existence that they were essentially religious.' 47 The
court did not agree and refused to grant chiropractic beliefs religious
status. 48 The court based this decision on the fact that the "religious"
organization the Masons belonged to, the Universal Life Church, was
dominated by chiropractors and was organized to give religious
legitimacy to the chiropractic ethics of its members, which were in
essence biological concerns, not religious concerns.1 49 The court's refusal
appeared to rest on a desire of the court not to grant a preferential status
to oppositions that really were the result of personal fears or scruples
with the medical procedure of injecting the human body with disease to
ward off disease.5
New York State courts, and the district courts interpreting state law,
do not appear to adopt as broad a view of religion as did the court in
Seeger when determining eligibility for religious exemptions under the
Public Health Law section 2164. s5 The courts are not bound by the
holding of the Supreme Court in Seeger because the Supreme Court
limited its holding to interpreting the statutory language of the religious
exemption granted under the Universal Military Training and Services
Act.' 52 Therefore, the broad definition of religion adopted by the
Supreme Court in that instance was a statutory definition rather than a
constitutional definition. ' A problem may result in future litigation over
144. See id.
145. See Mason, 851 F.2dat51.
146. See id.
147. See id. at 50.
148. See id. at 51.
149. See id. at 53.
150. See Lewis v. Sobol, 710 F. Supp. 506, 514 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
151. See Galinsky v. Bd. of Educ., No. 99-9027, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 9529, at *2 (2d Cir.
May 9, 2000) (holding that opposition to vaccination stemmed not from religious beliefs but from
personal fears as to well-being of the child to receive the vaccination); Mason, 851 F.2d at 52.
152. See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 174 (1965).
153. See Choper, supra note 102, at 588 (explaining the consequences of the generous
definition of religion in the statutory context).
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the New York State exemption where a petitioner argues that either
spiritually or biologically based beliefs can be considered by the holder
as a source of ultimate authority or concern. In such a case the court
would be more willing to classify such beliefs as religious if the
petitioner is able to connect his/her belief system to a transcendent
reality. To do so would require the petitioner to state that his/her
vegetarian belief system has consequences and meaning to them that
transcends experience on earth (for example, the afterlife and the natural
order of the world) and concerns areas of reality that cannot be
demonstrated by facts that are observable in everyday life.",4 If a
petitioner is able to do this, the court will be more likely to classify the
belief system as religious because the court will not feel as though it is
allowing secular concerns to outweigh the necessity of protecting the
general public from the spread of contagious diseases. The reasoning of
the Supreme Court in Seeger would support such an analysis.'
B. The Sincerity of the Religious Belief Proffered
A determination by the court that the beliefs asserted are religious
in nature alone does not entitle the holder of the beliefs to the
exemption.'56 A second inquiry into the sincerity of the beliefs asserted is
necessary.'57 The party requesting a religious exemption must
demonstrate, to the satisfaction of the court, that the asserted beliefs are
sincerely held.' Public Health Law section 2164(9) mandates this
inquiry.' The inquiry attempts to ensure that exemptions are not granted
to individuals who frame their opposition to vaccination in religious
terms in order to be afforded the legal remedy desired when in fact the
religious beliefs are not sincerely held because the opposition stems
from secular convictions.'1
Inquiry into the sincerity of religious beliefs of individuals requires
courts to exercise extreme caution, for the inquiry "in essence puts the
individual on trial for heresy.",6 ' The United States Court of Appeals for
154. See id. at 602.
155. See Seeger, 380 U.S. at 165-66.
156. See Sherr v. Northport-E. Northport Union Free Sch. Dist., 672 F. Supp. 81, 94 (E.D.N.Y.
1987).
157. See id.
158. See Lewis v. Sobol, 710 F. Supp. 506, 514-15 (S.D.N.Y 1989); Sherr, 672 F. Supp. at 94;
In re Christine M., 595 N.Y.S.2d 606, 614 (Fam. Ct. 1992).
159. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2164(9) (McKinney Supp. 2001) (exempting only children
whose parents hold "genuine and sincere religious beliefs").
160. See Sherr, 672 F. Supp. at 94.
161. Id.
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the Second Circuit has asserted, "[s]incerity analysis seeks to determine
the subjective good faith of an adherent ....The goal, of course, is to
protect only those beliefs which are held as a matter of conscience."' 62
This determination is complicated by the fact that the courts are
prohibited from questioning the truth of the underlying belief but, at the
same time, must afford protection to only those beliefs that are truly
held.6 6 Evidence the court examines in a sincerity analysis includes, but
is not limited to: (1) whether the adherent acted inconsistently with the
belief at issue; (2) whether the adherent materially gained by masking
secular beliefs with a religious veneer; and (3) the religion's history and
size."6 The issue of whether a belief is "truly" or "sincerely" held is a
question of fact, which inevitably requires the court to rely on its unique
ability to observe the demeanor
of the witnesses, thereby allowing the
6
court to weigh their credibility. 1
The Sherr case provides insight into the sincerity analysis
undertaken to determine whether religious beliefs were sincerely held so
as to merit exemption.' 66 The court denied the exemption sought by the
Sherrs on the ground that the beliefs asserted by the Sherrs were not
sincerely held. 67 The Sherrs initially asserted that they were entitled to
exemption because of their membership in The American Natural
Hygiene Society, Inc., an organization that opposes immunization under
any circumstances. The school district refused the claim for exemption
because the organization's opposition to mandatory vaccination did not
have a religious basis. 69 The Sherrs then claimed entitlement to
exemption by virtue of their membership in The Missionary Temple at
Large, Universal Religious Brotherhood, Inc., which was found to be
nothing but a mail-order church. 70 The Sherrs admitted that they joined
the Sarasota church for the purposes of gaining an exemption from
vaccination for their son. 7' This action illustrated that the Sherrs sought
to gain the legal remedy desired by framing their opposition in religious
terms. The reference to religion by the Sherrs was an afterthought, not
162. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Barber, 650 F.2d 430, 441 (2d Cir. 1981)
(citation omitted).
163. See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965); Barber,650 F.2d at441.
164. See Barber,650 F.2d at 441.
165. See Seeger, 380 U.S. at 185; In re Christine M., 595 N.Y.S.2d 606, 614 (Fain. Ct. 1992).
166. See Sherr v. Northport-E. Northport Union Free Sch. Dist., 672 F. Supp. 81, 94-97
(E.D.N.Y. 1987).
167. See id. at 96.
168. See id. at 94.
169. See id. at 95.
170. See id.
171. See id. at 96.
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the true source of the opposition. Additionally, the Sherrs acted
inconsistently with their purported opposition to intrusion into the body
on religious grounds when they allowed their children to be circumcised,
had decay removed from their children's teeth, and had one son Xrayed.72 The court put a great deal of weight on the testimony given by
Alan Paul Sherr. His demeanor and attitude while on the stand revealed
to the court that his opposition to vaccination did not stem from religious
convictions, but rather from medical concerns derived from his
chiropractic ethics.'73
The religious beliefs held by the Levys, the other set of petitioners
in the Sherr case, were deemed by the court to be sincerely held. 7 4 The
Levys' beliefs regarding human existence and the world manifested
themselves in each minute detail of the Levys' lives.'75 The Levys also
admitted to joining a church to gain an exemption from mandatory
vaccination; however, the church joined was found not to be merely a
mail order church, but rather a group that possessed views in line with
those expressed by the Levys 76 Therefore, the Levys were not
attempting to gain an exemption by giving their secular views religious
credence by joining a sham church. When assessing the sincerity of the
adherents' beliefs, the court again placed a great deal of weight on
witness testimony.'7 Louis Levy's testimony demonstrated that he took
the task of developing his religious foundations very seriously and spent
a great many years reading religious and spiritual texts.'78
C. The Third Prong:The PublicHealth/Welfare Interest
Religious freedom, a constitutional right granted under the First
Amendment, "cannot be absolute in a society continually striving to
achieve the proper balance between the liberties of its individual
members and the shared needs of the community at large."'7 9 It is wellsettled law that mandatory vaccination programs survive strict scrutiny
because, although religious freedom is a fundamental right granted to
United States citizens in the Bill of Rights, government interference is

172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

See id.
See id.
See id. at 97.
See id. at 96.
See id.
See id. at 94-97.
See id. at 95-96.
Id. at 83.
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justified by the compelling interest of society in protecting itself from
the spread of contagious diseases. 80
The New York State Legislature chose to provide to its citizens a
religiously based exemption from its mandatory inoculation program
that reflected the "urge to minimize imposition of the state's inoculation
program upon adherents of religious belief systems whose teachings are
at odds with the concept and methods of immunization utilized by the
state."' 8' The legislature sought to promote the dual goals of public
health protection and the right of serious religious practice.' At times,
however, dual achievement of these goals is impossible to obtain, in
which case the interest of the general public in protecting itself from
contagious disease trumps the right to religious freedom.' In order for
the religious exemption from vaccination to be granted, the court must
be satisfied that no circumstances exist at the present time that represent
a "clear and present danger" of epidemic of the communicable disease
being immunized against.8
V. ARE VEGETARIAN BELIEFS ENTITLED TO EXEMPTION PURSUANT
TO NEW YORK PUBLIC HEALTH LAW SECTION 2164(9)?
Vegetarianism has become quite popular throughout the United
States in recent years.' Recently, parents who are complete vegetarians,
or individuals who abstain from use and consumption of any animal
product or animal byproducts, and plan on raising their children to be the
same, have attempted to gain exemption from mandatory vaccination
programs on the ground that their beliefs should be classified as
religious.8 6 Petitions for waivers on this ground have been brought to
New York's Bridgehampton School District.'87 The school district
refused to grant religious exemptions for the children of vegetarian
parents.'8 8 The parents feel that they were wrongly refused because they
are being forced to act contrary to their spirituality.' s9 They are

180. See id. at 88.
181. Id.
182. See Brown v. City Sch. Dist., 429 N.Y.S.2d 355, 357 (Sup. Ct. 1980), affd, 444 N.Y.S.2d
878 (App. Div. 1981).
183. See Sherr, 672 F. Supp. at 88.
184. See Brown, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 357.

185.

See JAN PARR, THE YOUNG VEGETARIAN'S COMPANION 10

186.
187.
188.
189.

See
See
See
See

(1996).

Mead, supranote 2.
id.
id. at 5.
id.
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threatening to challenge the school district's determination in
the courts.'O
Complete vegetarians eschew all animal products, including honey
and dairy products. 9' They also refrain from using leather, goose down,
wool, and silk.'1 2 The decision to embrace complete vegetarianism is
more than a dietary decision; it is a lifestyle choice.9 Complete
vegetarians' opposition to inoculation is rooted in the fact that the
vaccinations issued are cultured using animal and human fetal cells.'94
Let us assume, for the purposes of this Note, that a set of complete
vegetarian parents commenced an action against a school district located
in New York, contending that the immunizations required by Public
Health Law section 2164 are contrary to their genuine and sincere
religious beliefs and that they are entitled to the benefit of the exemption
set forth in section 2164(9). How would the court go about determining
this claim? What would be the arguments put forth by the parents
requesting exemption? What would the school district argue in
response?
Initially, the court will be required to undertake an inquiry into
whether the grounds asserted by vegetarians as the basis for their
opposition to vaccination are religious in nature.'9 5 Vegetarians will
argue that the basic purpose of the religion clauses of the First
Amendment is to "promote and assure the fullest possible scope of
religious liberty and tolerance for all and to nurture the conditions which
secure the best hope of attainment of that end."'96 Such purpose would be
effectuated through a constitutional definition of religion that is broad
enough to recognize new and unorthodox concepts of religion that might
develop over time and to protect minority religious groups. '
Vegetarians might assert that a broad definition of religion that
encompasses vegetarian beliefs should be adopted by the court.
Vegetarians might argue that their vegetarian beliefs, which mandate
that they abstain from the use or consumption of animal products,
occupy a position in their lives parallel to that held by God in the life of
190. See id.
191. See PARR,supranote 185, at 12.
192. See id.
193. See id.
194. See Mead, supra note 2.
195. See Sherr v. Northport-E. Northport Union Free Sch. Dist., 672 F. Supp. 81, 92 (E.D.N.Y.
1987).
196. Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 305 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
197. See Ben Clements, Note, Defining "Religion" in the First Amendment: A Functional
Approach, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 532, 535 (1989).
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an adherent of an orthodox faith admittedly worthy of exemption. 8
Their belief that exploitation of animals is in opposition to the natural
order of the world pervades every facet of their lives.99 Every decision
made by a vegetarian throughout the course of a day is grounded in
promoting this belief.2 Often vegetarians are greatly inconvenienced
and subjected to ridicule on the basis of their beliefs.20 ' Animals, in the
view of vegetarians, occupy a position in the universe equal to that of
humans, and therefore should not be tortured and killed for human
benefit.202 Additionally, vegetarians would argue that their opposition
stems from "ultimate concerns" in that they would choose to disregard
elementary self-interest before they would exploit animals through the
use and consumption of animals and their byproducts. 23 Furthermore,
vegetarians might argue that their vegetarian beliefs are religious in
nature because such beliefs provide a "comprehensive belief system that
addresses the fundamental questions of human existence ...and ...
gives rise to duties of conscience. '' 204 For those who adhere to it,
vegetarianism is a belief system that manifests a profound respect for all
living organisms, both human and animal, and their unique position in
the hierarchy of creation. 25 In this regard, it is incumbent on man not to
disrupt the natural harmony of the universe by exploiting animal life for
his own advantage. 2°6 In attempting to maintain this harmony, man
strives to achieve a level of communion with nature. Vegetarians believe
that it is impossible to achieve the desired harmony when man
disregards and exploits, through use and consumption, the inherent value
of the other forms of animal life. 2°7 Through the pursuit of universal
harmony, vegetarians seek spiritual perfection, in that they themselves
become a part of the universal harmony.0
The State might respond to the vegetarians' argument that their
beliefs qualify for an exemption from vaccination by asserting that
198. Cf.United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 173 (1965).
199. See PARR, supra note 185, at 12.
200. See id. at 13-14.
201. See id. at 13.
202. See id. at 14.
203. See id.
204. Clements, supra note 197, at 553 (suggesting a constitutional definition of religion that
combines the idea of Judge Adams of the Third Circuit-a comprehensive belief system addressing
questions "fundamental" to human existence-with the generally held notion that religious beliefs
involve a strong sense of duty and devotion).
205. See Mead, supra note 2.
206. See PARR, supranote 185, at 14,48-49.
207. See id.
208. See id. at 14-15.
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vegetarian beliefs are not of a religious nature, but are instead secular.
The State might argue that vegetarianism is not a religious belief system
because it does not involve "extratemporal consequences."' ' An inquiry
into the extratemporal consequences of vegetarianism would require the
court to determine whether the effects of actions taken pursuant to or in
derogation of the dictates of vegetarianism extend to affect the adherent
beyond his/her lifetime. ° The State might argue that repercussions for
violations of vegetarian beliefs do not extend beyond the lifetime of the
adherent, for example, wearing leather will not subject a vegetarian to
eternal damnation. The State might assert that, to the extent that an
adherent believes that a transgression of vegetarian tenets will result in
repercussions in the afterlife, this belief reflects the orthodox religious
concept of punishment after death for the sins (transgressions of
religious law) committed during life. The State will support this
contention by demonstrating that vegetarianism cannot be classified as a
religion by virtue of the fact that the majority of vegetarians are
members of other recognized religious organizations that espouse
differing tenets (e.g., Hinduism, Buddhism, Judaism, Christianity,
etc.). 2" Further, the defendants will assert that vegetarianism lacks any of
the indicia generally associated with religious organizations (e.g., formal
services, existence of clergy, ceremonial functions, sacred objects, and
common observation of holidays)."' The defendants would argue that to
grant vegetarian beliefs free exercise protection simply for the reason
that such beliefs are deeply held would impede the state's ability to
advance societal interests because strongly held convictions pervade
essentially all areas of ordinary government involvement. 3
If the court chooses to adopt a narrow definition of religious beliefs
that excluded vegetarian beliefs in an attempt to maximize the goal of
public health, the inquiry would end there and the exemption would be
denied.2 14 If the court decides to adopt a broad definition of religious
beliefs that encompasses vegetarian beliefs in order to permit
vegetarians to practice their beliefs free from educational sanction, the
2 15
court would then inquire into the sincerity of the petitioner's beliefs.
To determine sincerity, a great deal of weight will be placed on the

209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

See Choper, supranote 102, at 599.
See id.
See PARR, supranote 185, at 49-54.
See Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 209 (3d Cir. 1979) (Adams, J., concurring).
See Choper, supranote 102, at 596.
See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 173-74 (1965).
See id.
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testimony of the petitioners."' The petitioners will have to demonstrate
to the satisfaction of the court that they live their daily lives in
accordance with vegetarian beliefs and that much contemplation went
into the decision to abide by vegetarian principles. The longer a
vegetarian has abstained from animal product consumption and use, the
more convincing the sincerity argument will be to the court.
The State will attempt to demonstrate instances where a vegetarian
acted inconsistently with vegetarian beliefs, if possible. Inconsistent
actions would include eating meat and other animal products, possessing
leather items, or inoculating older siblings. If the State is able to prove
that the petitioners acted inconsistently with their espoused belief
system, it is more likely that the court will find the petitioners beliefs not
to be sincerely held. Inconsistent action lessens the appearance of
sincerity in the eyes of the court.1
The State will also try to prove that vegetarians are merely hiding
the true secular source of their opposition to vaccination behind
vegetarian convictions. This could be done through exploration of the
source of the vegetarians' beliefs; for example, uncovering that the
petitioners became practicing vegetarians because they believe ingestion
of animal products causes medical complications in later years. Belief
systems premised on chiropractic or other medical and scientific
teachings are not likely to be found to be sincerely held. 8
The court's determination that the beliefs espoused were sincerely
held, provided that the geographical area was not experiencing an
outbreak of contagious diseases of any kind, 19 would entitle the
petitioners to religious exemption from the mandatory vaccination
program. A negative determination would result in the opposite
conclusion. The court must beware if presented with such a case as
hypothesized here that the greater the number of exemptions granted the
lower the percentage of the population that is immunized against
contagious disease.22 Therefore, adopting a broad definition of religion
2
works to reduce the larger public health goal of population immunity.
It is important to bear in mind that many of the diseases being
immunized against at one time caused much pain, suffering, and death
216. See Sherr v. Northport-E. Northport Union Free Sch. Dist., 672 F. Supp. 81, 96 (E.D.N.Y.
1987).
217. See id.
218. See Mason v. Gen. Brown Cent. Sch. Dist., 851 F.2d 47,51 (2d Cir. 1988).
219. See Brown v. City Sch. Dist., 429 N.Y.S.2d 355, 357 (Sup. Ct. 1980), affd, 444 N.Y.S.2d
878 (App. Div. 1981).
220. See Aspinwall, supra note 8, at 129.
221. See id.
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throughout the general public. Increasing the number of nonimmunized
individuals should alarm us. Such action could eventually lead to
epidemics, especially in overly populated urban areas.=2
VI.

CONCLUSION

What would a court interpreting New York Public Health Law
section 2164(9) rule if confronted with such a case? The courts could
adopt a broad definition of religious beliefs that encompasses vegetarian
beliefs, thereby significantly increasing the number of individuals
protected by exemption to the detriment of the general population.
Alternatively, the courts could interpret religion narrowly, excluding
vegetarian beliefs from such definition, at the risk of denying
vegetarians the ability to abide by their convictions in opposition to the
exploitation of animals without suffering pecuniary or penal sanctions.
Neither alternative presents an easy determination for the courts. Either
the rights of vegetarians to practice their beliefs will suffer or the public
health goal of population immunity will be in jeopardy.
The most practical approach for the courts to follow would be to
adopt a broad definition of religion encompassing vegetarian beliefs,
while stressing the sincerity of belief inquiry to weed out individuals not
truly deserving of exemption. Exemptions would only be granted to
those individuals demonstrating strict adherence to their vegetarian
principles. The determination would rest in the hands of the trial court to
judge the credibility and sincerity of the individuals arguing for
exemption. The court would inquire whether vegetarian beliefs pervade
the life of the individual petitioning for exemption. Also important to the
sincerity inquiry is determining whether medical concerns are the real
motivation behind an individual's adherence to a vegetarian belief
system. If that were the case, the court would deny granting the
exemption because the courts have refused to grant exemptions to
individuals who merely frame their opposition to exemption in religious
terms, when in fact their opposition stems from secular or medical
concerns.= Therefore, the courts applying this rationale would grant
exemption to a vegetarian individual who has adhered to vegetarian
beliefs and practices for a sufficient amount of time because of a belief
that animal exploitation of any kind is contrary to the natural order of the
universe. Conversely, courts would deny exemption to individuals who
222. See id. at 112-13.
223. See Sherr v. Northport-E. Northport Union Free Sch. Dist., 672 F. Supp. 81, 96 (E.D.N.Y.
1987).
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espouse vegetarian beliefs, but, in practice only sporadically refrain from
the use of animal products or abstain from their use on purely medical
grounds.
It defies common sense to refuse to grant an exemption to
individuals who have abstained from the use and consumption of animal
products for many years on the basis of their vegetarian beliefs, while
granting exemption to members of traditional religious groups who
assert that the teachings of their religion run contrary to vaccination,
even if they have just recently begun to practice such belief. This
approach would provide for accommodation between allowing
individuals the freedom to practice their beliefs free from government
interference, while still promoting the public welfare. Additionally, the
court is equipped with the ability to deny an exemption to any
petitioning individual when there exists a clear and present danger of the
spread of a communicable disease to the general public.24 The ability to
refuse exemption in this instance ensures that the interest of the public
health to be free from contagious disease will trump the right to free
practice of religious beliefs where necessary.
CarolineL. Kraus*

224. See Brown, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 357.
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